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Abstract 
 
In western countries irregular immigrants constitute a sizeable segment of the population. By 
combining quantitative and qualitative research methods, this article describes and explains 
irregular immigrants’ patterns of spatial concentration and incorporation in the Netherlands. 
So far these spatial patterns have not been described and explained systematically, neither in 
the Netherlands nor elsewhere. The article shows that illegal residence is selectively 
embedded in the (urban) social structure in various ways. The authors argue that irregular 
immigrants are likely to be spatially concentrated and incorporated in other western countries 
in similar ways; now and in the foreseeable future. 
 
Introduction 
 
Irregular immigrants have become part and parcel of the Western European population. This 
is the case not only in the Mediterranean countries, but also in countries such as Germany, 
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England and France (Sciortino, 2004; Cornelius et al., 2004; OECD, 2005). Despite the 
restrictive immigration policies in these countries, there does not seem to be any decline in the 
number of irregular immigrants in Western Europe. The same can be said about the situation 
in the United States (Cornelius, 2005). There are even indications that a restrictive 
immigration policy is counterproductive, as it is under such conditions much more difficult 
for irregular immigrants to return to their country of origin.In the Netherlands, ten to fifteen 
thousand irregular immigrants are apprehended annually (Engbersen et al., 2002). We define 
irregular immigrants as people who stay in the country without official permission to do so at 
the time of the research, regardless of whether they have entered the country legally and 
regardless of whether they are economically active or not. Many of them came to the 
Netherlands on tourist visa and stayed, others crossed the border illegally or became illegal 
when they were refused refugee status (Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Staring 2001). There are 
no official registrations of illegal immigrants  in the Netherlands. Van der Heijden and Cruyff 
(2004) used apprehension data to estimate that, in the period 1997-2003, between 125,000 and 
230,000 illegal immigrants were residing annually in the Netherlands. In this article we 
assume, on the basis of the estimations of Van der Heijden and Cruyff (2004) that the number 
of irregular immigrants in the Netherlands is about 150,000. This is equivalent to 
approximately one percent of the regular Dutch population and ten percent of the foreign-born 
population (cf. Snel et al., 2005). Irregular immigrants in the Netherlands originate from more 
than two hundred countries. The largest groups are Turks, Moroccans, Algerians and 
Surinamese. In addition, there is a growing number from Eastern and Central Europe. The 
dividing lines between asylum seekers, commuting immigrants and irregular immigrants are 
sometimes diffuse and changing. Asylum seekers, for example, are often confused with illegal 
immigrants, whereas they only lose their residence rights when they are rejected and refuse to 
leave. Recently, the number of aliens that become ‘illegal’ after they have been rejected as 
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asylum seekers has increased. However, recent research indicates that the share of rejected 
asylum seekers within the irregular population is about 15 percent (De Boom et al.  2006). 
Most irregular immigrants cross the border on a tourist visa (and then overstay) or cross the 
border illegaly without applying for asylum.  
 Irregular immigrants are unevenly spread across the Netherlands. An explorative study  
indicated that they are mainly present in the four large cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) and in a number of border and rural areas (Engbersen et 
al., 2002). In some places irregular immigrants therefore make up a considerably larger part of 
the population than the national average of one percent -  locally probably increasing up to 
about six to eight percent (Leerkes et al., 2004). Studies in other countries indicate a similar 
pattern: irregular immigrants are concentrated in specific urban and rural environments 
(Chavez, 1992; Miller, 1995; Bade, 2003; Cornelius, 2005). 
So far, there is no systematic empirical information on the spatial distribution of 
irregular immigrants. This does not only apply to the Netherlands, but also to other western 
countries. The research  question of this article is: To what extent, and in what way, is illegal 
residence spatially concentrated within the Netherlands, and how can patterns of spatial 
concentration and incorporation be explained? Unlike in previous studies, the spatial 
spreading of irregular immigrants will be described in quantitative terms.  The central 
determinants of irregular immigrants’ residential pattern will also be operationalised and 
tested quantitatively. Statistical results will be interpreted and illustrated with data from  two 
ethnographical neighbourhood studies. Such a triangular approach is innovative in this 
research field.  
This article focuses on illegal residence in urban environments, as most irregular 
immigrants live in (big) cities. More specifcally, our fieldwork was conducted in two urban 
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neighborhoods in  the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague, which are the second- and third-
largest cities in the Netherlands.   
First, we present the central theoretical concepts and assumptions that constitute this 
study.. Next, the data sources and research methods will be explained.  Then we 
brieflydescribethe spatial distribution of the illegal population across the Dutch municipalities 
and provinces. We then analyse (the determinants of) the spatial patterns of illegal residence 
in urban environments. Finally, we outline  the implications of our findings for other western 
immigration countries,  projected onto the near future.  
 
 
Spatial opportunity structure 
 
There is a rich international literature on the spatial concentration of regular migrant groups. 
The American literature where researchers from  the Chicago School until today have written 
about processes of spatial distribution among migrant groups, is particularly rich (see, among 
others, Park et al., 1925; Massey and Denton, 1993; Jargowsky, 1997). In Europe, a 
comparable literature is emerging. Europe  is now confrontated  by similar processes of 
spatial and economic segregation, spatial mobility, and by the emergence of ‘residential 
enclaves’ (Van der Wouden et al., 2001; Musterd, 2002; Kempen and Idamir, 2003; Musterd, 
2004). 
 Various studies provide  indications about the crucial factors of the spatial settlement 
pattern of illegal migrants. A first crucial factor is the embedding in (transnational) social 
networks. For this incorporation process, one can use the term ‘social capital’ as 
operationalized by Portes (1998). Social capital relates to the ability of irregular immigrants to 
mobilize resources (money, work, housing, information, documents, and also possible 
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marriage partners) from their ethnic and family networks. Social capital determines to a large 
degree the residential opportunities for irregular immigrants (Mahler, 1995; Engbersen, 2001; 
Grzymala-Kazlowska, 2005; Engberen et al.,  2006). The social capital that illegal migrants 
can mobilize, varies both between and within ethnic groups. Not every immigrant has access 
to a network of migrants. Dutch studies show that particularly the Turkish, Moroccan and 
Surinamese groups (and, to a lesser extent, African groups) can fall back on established 
migrant communities (Burgers and Engbersen, 1999). Lack of social capital is particularly 
found among rejected asylum seekers who come from new immigration countries. But 
strongly marginalized irregular immigrants, who cannot depend on established migrant 
communities, can also be found in other groups. If they don’t  find a job, they will have to 
fend for themselves in most cases. 
Labour opportunities constitute the second residential factor. Various authors assume 
that there is increasing room for low skilled jobs (formal and informal) at the bottom of the 
labour market in large cities (Sassen, 1991; Miller, 1995; Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000). In 
this part of the economy the remains of industrial activities (e.g. the textile industry with its 
sweatshops) can be found,and  there is low wage labour in all kinds of enterprises in the 
(personal) service industries (cleaning, security, catering, care for children and the elderly, 
home improvement). Furthermore, a sizeable ‘ethnic economy’ has evolved in many large 
cities in which informal labour by illegal compatriots is a rather common phenomenon. By 
keeping the labour costs low, these businesses hope to achieve economic success. There is 
also considerable demand for irregular labour in agriculture and horticulture (Cornelius, 
2005). Irregular immigrants are very important for this sector in Western Europe (see 
Cornelius et al., 2004).    
 A third relevant factor is the presence of cheap and accessible accommodation. In 
some city districts, there is a favourable local housing market for irregular immigrants, 
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because there are many private landlords who are willing to rent out flats, rooms or beds to 
irregular immigrants. Building on Mahler’s views (Mahler 1995), Burgers (1998) noted the 
existence of ‘parallel housing markets’ in Dutch city districts, i.e. informal markets that are 
largely similar to the formal housing market. He points to two parallels. On the one hand, 
there is social housing in the Netherlands (with its ‘rent ceilings’), which makes it possible for 
irregular immigrants to live in with compatriots for free or in exchange for a modest rent. On 
the other hand, there is a private housing market to which irregular immigrants have access if 
they can afford to pay higher rents. By now, there are also a number of hybrid forms in which 
regular migrants sublet or re-let their council houses to irregular immigrants (Leerkes et al., 
2004). Offering accommodation to irregular immigrants can be a welcome source of income 
for  regular migrants (and also for  established illegal ones). Those who have been in the 
Netherlands for a longer period of time can thus start a career as a landlord.. These landlords 
thus link the formal and informal housing market. Due to governmental regulations the rents – 
particularly in the social sector – are often lower than market prices. This makes informal 
subtenancy lucrative. Our study also indicates that the active dispersal policy of asylum 
seekers has some effects on the the spreading of irregular immigrants (see Leerkes et al., 
2004). These effects are limited. Firstly, most of the irregular immigrants do no have an 
asylum history and were therefore not subjected to a  policy of dispersal. Secondly, failed 
asylum seekers often appear to leave rural and small town areas and head to the big cities. 
 The three central dimensions of the opportunity structure of illegal residence –  social 
capital, labour and housing – are often connected. People who have much social capital often 
have easier access to labour and housing (Engbersen, 2001). Others are more dependent on 
commercial intermediaries (irregular temporary employment agencies and landlords) for 
obtaining work and housing. Various ethnographic studies conducted in Dutch cities and in 
cities such as New York, Athens, London, Berlin, and Brussels make clear that the 
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dimensions of the opportunity structure for irregular immigrants have a clear spatial 
component (Mahler 1995; Romaniszyn 1996; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Alt 2003; 
Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005). Opportunities for illegal are limited  to certain urban 
environments. It is the spatial proximity of labour, social networks  and housing that seems to 
determine why irregular immigrants live and work in particular city regions.  
 The three dimensions that can be discerned in the literature, have now been mentioned. 
Our study yields as a new insight that the presence of (poor) singles also contributes to the 
opportunity structure of illegal residence. Single households represent a fourth, independent 
dimension of this opportunity structure. This dimension has a clear spatial component as well.  
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Research methods 
 
This study is based on the registered home addresses of all irregular immigrants apprehended 
in the Netherlands between 1 January 1997 and 1 October 2003. The data have been provided 
by the 25 Dutch police forces and are taken from the so-called Vreemdelingen Administratie 
Systeem, a national database in which all known aliens are registered. For each municipality 
and neighbourhood (postal code area) we counted the number of addresses where, according 
to  police data, irregular immigrants were living (hereinafter called ‘absolute concentration’). 
This measure, which gives an indication of the local density of the illegal population, was 
linked to a database containing information on various demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the neighbourhood and the share  of private homeownership in the 
neighbourhoods.
 
This database with neighbourhood characteristics is from the Dutch Central 
Bureau for Statistics and is called Kerncijfers Wijken en Buurten 1999.  The data on private 
homeownership were supplied by the Ministry of Housing and are taken from the research 
Geomarktprofiel 1998As a measure of the relative number of irregular immigrants 
(hereinafter called ‘relative concentration’), we divided the absolute concentration of irregular 
immigrants by the number of legal local residents. Next, we identified the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the neighbourhoods where illegal residence is quite widespread. By means 
of multiple regression analysis the relative concentration of irregular immigrants was 
predicted on the basis of such neighbourhood characteristics. 
The fieldwork was conducted in Bospolder-Tussendijken in Rotterdam and de 
Schilderswijk in The Hague in 2003. These neighbourhoods were selected because police data 
indicated that illegal residence occurs regularly there. Both neighbourhoods are part of 
multicultural districts populated by many non-western immigrants. The former 
neighbourhood has 65% immigrants, including many Turks, Moroccans, Cape Verdeans and 
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Surinamese. The latter neighbourhood comprised  85% immigrants, including many Turks, 
Surinamese, Moroccans and Antilleans. We interviewed twenty key informants – from 
various  professional groups – who regularly come into contact with irregular immigrants, and 
who could indicate why, and how, irregular immigrants  reside there. These were employees 
of the (alien) police, the municipal authority, and housing associations, as well as community 
and social care workers. The interviews  were conducted with the help of a short topic list. 
In addition, we interviewed 65 irregular immigrants (from Morocco, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Somalia, India and Pakistan) and 45 providers of accommodation  (from a Dutch, Moroccan, 
Turkish, Surinamese or Somali background). We also spoke with  five mixed couples of 
whom one of the partners stayed in the Netherlands illegally. The interviews with irregular 
immigrants and providers of accomodation  were carried out by a team of interviewers. 
Selection of the interviewers was based on ethnic background (the interviews were held in the 
respondent’s mother tongue), experience with the research groups concerned, and 
interviewing skills. All interviewers attended, or had completed, higher education. The 
interviewers recruited respondents with the help of key informants (police, social workers, et 
cetera), or searched for respondents in cafes, teahouses, mosques, or in the street. 
Respondents were asked to bring the interviewer into contact with other irregular immigrants 
or with their accomodation providers. The interviewers made use of a questionnaire with open 
and closed questions. Irregular immigrants that took part in the research were given a 
financial reward.  
 
Limitations 
 
Our study has some limitations. Firstly, the quantitative data primarily give a picture of the 
illegal population that ran a certain risk of being apprehended. Although the number of 
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apprehensions was substantial (N=107,322), it was impossible to determine to what extent the 
home addresses of apprehended irregular immigrants constitute a correct representation of the 
home addresses of all irregular immigrants that lived in the Netherlands between 1997 and 
2003. Futhermore,  in a number of apprehensions, no home address was registered, and 
sometimes the stated home address proved to be the address where the person was 
apprehended or the address of a police station or detention centre. We could solve most of 
these complications by checking and cleaning up the database.
1
 Registrations without home 
address, for example, often involved irregular immigrants who were apprehended at  the 
border and therefore had not yet taken up residence in the Netherlands. The addresses of 
police stations and detention centres could be identified. In addition, we examined how often 
the police may have recorded the place of apprehension as the ‘home address’ while the 
arrested person was actually  living somewhere else. It is not likely that this happened very 
often. When the address was not registered, we could sometimes use the place of 
apprehension as an indication of the home address (e.g. in the case of house raids). Bias as a 
result of incomplete or inaccurate registration of home addresses may therefore be said to be 
limited. 
 Local police priorities naturally influence the number of local apprehensions. 
Increasingly, specific raids take place in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague, as well as in 
some rural concentration areas. Increasingly, employers are also subjected to checks by the 
labour inspection. However, most irregular immigrants are still apprehended during regular 
police work, i.e. as crime suspects or because of minor offences such as driving to fast or 
dodging fares  (Van der Leun, 2003). This is probably the reason why we do not find 
indications for substantial geographical differences in the risk of arrest.
 2
      
Although the results of the neighbourhood studies cannot be generalized as such, we 
aimed at ‘qualitative completeness’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Lofland and Lofland, 
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1995). We kept looking for additional respondents until we found no more new types of 
accommodation, and appeared to have obtained a complete picture of the reasons why  
irregular immigrants resided in these neighborhoods. The limitations of the separate research 
methods and sources were met as much as possible by triangulation. We could compare the 
information provided by the professionals, landlords and irregular immigrants. The 
information obtained from the people involved was compared to the quantitative results. This 
gave us more confidence   in the validity of the findings. 
 
 
Results 
 
The distribution of irregular immigrants across Dutch provinces and municipalities 
 
Illegal residence is not merely an urban phenomenon. For the highest relative concentrations 
of  irregular immigrants were found in both the most and least densely populated areas. There 
are also irregular immigrants in rural areas in the north of the province of North-Holland (A), 
and in the provinces of Brabant (B) and Groningen (C) (see Figures 1a and 1b). In rural areas 
illegal residence is primarily connected with the demand for seasonal workers in the 
horticultural and agricultural sector (Bakker, 2001). The registered addresses suggest that the 
presence of asylum seekers’ centres, Chinese restaurants, and brothels are also important, 
albeit to a lesser extent. The increased degree of illegal residence in the south of the province 
of Limburg (D) is, in part, due to drug tourism from bordering EU member states. Many 
illegal aliens there have the French, Belgian or German nationality and have usually lost the 
right of residence in the Netherlands since they were declared ‘undesired alien’ after they had 
caused (drug) nuisance. Finally, a substantial part of the irregular immigrants is found in 
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municipalities with detention and deportation centres for irregular immigrants and rejected 
asylum seekers (e.g. in Zevenaar (north of B), Ter Apel (near C) and Rijsbergen (near D)). 
Apprehended irregular immigrants often stay in these institutions for months and often more 
than once (van Kalmthout 2004). In the description below, we will confine ourselves to illegal 
residence in urban environments, not  in detention. In addition we focus on illegal residence 
by (non western) ‘third country nationals’ (i.e. people from outside the EU that are not 
nationals of states in North-America or Oceania).
 
 
 
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
 
The spatial incorporation of irregular immigrants in urban environments 
 
It is common practice to use segregation indexes (S) to measure the extent to which two 
groups are spatially segregated from one another. (Strictly speaking, the term dissimilarity 
index should be used when two groups do not constitute the total population). The index 
indicates the percentage of the group that should move in order to bring about a complete 
mutual mixing. The higher the index, the lower the extent of mixing, and the stronger the 
extent of residential segregation. The results are calculated on the level of postal code areas 
and should be interpreted with some cautiousness for postal code areas differ somewhat in 
size. Figure 2 shows the extent to which the illegal and legal populations are spatially 
segregated. Three curves can be distinguished, which respectively, from top to bottom, 
indicate the mixing with the Dutch native population (S=52), the total urban population 
(S=48) and the immigrant population (S=33).
 
What becomes clear is that, compared to ethnic 
minority groups, Dutch natives  less often  have irregular immigrants as neighbours. Sixty 
percent of the irregular immigrants live in city districts that house 13 percent of all Dutch 
 13 
natives, 41 percent of all the non-western immigrants, and 17 percent of the total legal urban 
population. Furthermore, eighty percent of the illegal urban population live in districts that 
house 31 percent of the native population, 61 percent of the legal non-western immigrants, 
and 35 percent of the total urban population (see the dotted lines in the figure). 
 As expected, the illegal population is selectively incorporated in the urban landscape. 
Whereas some city districts house relatively large numbers of irregular immigrants, most 
neighbourhoods house none or only a few. This observation implies that irregular immigrants 
usually constitute a much smaller proportion of the local population than the estimated 
national average of one percent, and sometimes substantially higher - probably up to about six 
or eight percent (cf. Leerkes et al., 2004). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The question is how  the selective spatial incorporation of irregular immigrants can be 
explained. Table 1 gives a ranking of twenty neighbourhoods that house the most irregular 
immigrants. The table contains only a few Amsterdam and Rotterdam neighbourhoods, but 
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that is mainly because the local police record the home addresses of irregular immigrants less 
often than in other cities. The police in The Hague, on the other hand, record them quite 
accurately. In the Hague (48%) the percentage of registered residential addresses  is almost 
twice as high as in Amsterdam (24%) and Rotterdam (21%). Nationally this figure is 30 
percent. If the police registration had been better, the Amsterdam and Rotterdam 
neighbourhoods would have been featuring prominently in this top twenty list (see Leerkes et 
al. 2004). 
The characteristics of the neighbourhoods provide a first confirmation of the 
theoretical expectations. Irregular immigrants are often housed in poor immigrant districts 
(the average proportion of non-western immigrants for the twenty districts is 57 percent 
versus 11 percent for all the city districts).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 contains five linear regression models.
 3
 The models show that differences between 
neighbourhoods as to the percentage of irregular immigrants depend on neighbourhood 
differences in the concentration of legal non-western immigrants, the socio-economic status, 
the size and form of the neighbourhood economy, the share of private home ownership, and 
the concentration of single-person households. The first four models test to what extent the 
spatial distribution of the illegal population corresponds with our (initial) theoretical 
assumptions. The independent variables are  indicators of the extent to which neighbourhoods 
contain non-western migrant communities (% non-western immigrants), economic 
opportunities (the relative number of establishments in commercial services, manufacturing 
and non-commercial services) , and housing opportunities (socio-economic status of the 
neighborhood and % private home ownership) . We examined  whether the fourth model 
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could be improved with additional independent variables. The percentage of single people did 
indeed have an additional effect (fifth model).
 4
   Below the quantitative results in table 2 are 
expounded and interpreted with findings that are of a qualitative nature. 
 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
The presence of non-western migrant communities 
 
Two statistical observations suggest that legal immigration tends to bring about illegal (chain) 
migration. First of all, as table 2 shows, the effect of the proportion of immigrants in the 
neighbourhoods on the relative concentration of irregular immigrants hardly decreases when 
other neighbourhood characteristics are incorporated into the model.
 
  A  second indication is 
the settlement pattern of irregular immigrants from countries of which there are large 
established ethnic groups (e.g. Turkey, Morocco, and Suriname). This pattern can be quite 
well illustrated with the help of a number of maps of The Hague (see Figures 3 (a and b) and 
4 (a and b)). It turns out, for example, that a relatively large number of illegal Turks live in the 
districts where legal Turks live, and that irregular  Moroccans usually end up in the districts 
with many regular  Moroccans. This effect is somewhat stronger for the Turks than for the 
Moroccans, which has to do with the stronger social cohesion and trust networks among 
Turkish immigrants (Engbersen, 2001; Staring, 2001). 
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[Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here] 
 
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b about here] 
 
 
The fieldwork suggests that  such causal connections can be direct and indirect. Firstly, it 
turns out that many respondents live in these neighbourhoods because family or 
acquaintances, who usually took care of them after they arrived, live nearby. These 
established immigrants often help illegal newcomers in their primary network to find a room 
or flat in the neighbourhood later on. The indirect relations are mainly found among irregular 
immigrants that have no family members in the Netherlands. It turned out that some of them 
had come to Europe with the help of human smugglers and/or had gone through asylum 
procedures to no effect, often elsewhere in the Netherlands. They told us they preferred 
neighbourhoods with an ethnic variety and where many people speak their language or 
dialect, which makes them ‘inconspicuous’,. In addition, they hope to benefit from the ‘ethnic 
infrastructure’ established by previous immigration flows: mosques (to pray and meet people, 
and where sometimes free food is served during Ramadan), ethnic shops (where they can buy 
products from the country of origin and can sometimes get a job), and coffee houses (to spend 
the day cheaply and come into contact with people). The tendency to seek accommodation 
near places where compatriots live – also coined ‘ethnic self-segregation’ (see Steick et al., 
2003)-, is well documented for regular migrants (Musterd et al. 1998; Van der Wouden and 
Bruine 2001). That the presence of legal compatriots tempts irregular immigrants to live in 
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relatively homogenous ‘urban villages’ (Gans 1982) is aptly illustrated by the following 
excerpt from an interview: 
 
I went to live in Bospolder-Tussendijken because my brother lived here and because there are 
many Moroccans with a valid residence permit in this neighbourhood who help me with all 
kinds of things when I need them. This neighbourhood mainly has  a social function for me. I 
meet a lot of people with whom I make appointments and chat about all and sundry (illegal 
Moroccan). 
 
Certain groups of irregular immigrants do not take up residence in deprived immigrant 
neighbourhoods because they have family members or compatriots who live there, but rather 
because of the ‘favourable’ supply of housing. This becomes more evident when we include 
the effect of the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods into the analysis. 
 
The socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods 
 
Illegal residence is associated with low income in two ways. Firstly,  low skilled potential 
immigrants have little chance of obtaining a legal residence permit because the Dutch 
government has  strongly discouraged low skilled labour migration for some time now (Van 
der Leun, 2003). Secondly, it is practically impossible to earn a high income without a 
residence (and working) permit. Therefore it is understandable that irregular immigrants often 
end up at the bottom of the housing market. 
 Table 2 indicates that the socio-economic status of the neighbourhoods yields an 
independent negative effect on the degree of illegal residence.
5 
Two additional maps of The 
Hague confirm this observation. (figures 5a and 5b).
 
 Illegal Eastern Europeans usually live in 
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neighbourhoods where many illegal Turks and Moroccans reside (near A), and are thus not 
spatially embedded in the legal Eastern European community. The few legal Eastern 
Europeans in The Hague (staff of embassies and international organizations) reside primarily 
in the more upmarket city districts (near B). 
 In the neighbourhoods in which we conducted our fieldwork, an informal commercial 
housing sector has emerged. This informal sector is particularly important to irregular 
immigrants who cannot fall back  on the support of family or friends in the Netherlands. Both 
in Rotterdam and in The Hague, landlords of mainly Dutch, Turkish or Hindu-Surinamese 
origin offer accommodation to indigent people in general and irregular immigrants in 
particular. They rent out floors, rooms and (bunk) beds. Premises where ten to thirty people 
can rent a bed are also called ‘sleeping houses’ by the local residents. In the commercial 
circuit the price for a bed turns out to be about  € 150-250, the price for a flat is € 600-700. 
This is clearly more than what is paid by  irregular immigrants who live in with their family 
or acquaintances (usually for free) or have a flat on sublet  from a friend or family member (€  
150-400). 
 
 
[Insert Figures 5a and 5b about here] 
 
 
Although irregular immigrants from Eastern Europe often reside in rural horticultural areas, 
we also found some in Bospolder-Tussendijken and, more particularly, in de Schilderswijk. 
They were, in majority, Bulgarian. The men usually passed the night in sleeping houses, and 
were picked up by minivans in the Schilderswijk and taken to the greenhouses in the nearby 
Westland area every workday (Engbersen et al. 2006). The men slept in sleeping houses 
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because of their relatively modest incomes, but also because of the absence of established 
family members and compatriots in the neighbourhood. A lack of economic capital drives this 
group to deprived neighbourhoods, while a lack of social capital makes them dependent on 
the commercial circuit within these neighbourhoods. However, the men also stayed in these 
houses because they more or less chose to. The Bulgarians, for instance, told us they had 
come to the Netherlands first of all to earn money for their families. These labour migrants, or 
‘birds of passage’ (Piore, 1979), aim for a temporary stay in the Netherlands and hope to save 
as much money as possible. Therefore they    are willing to make a concession as to how they 
are housed. This phenomenon has also been observed among regular labour migrants. In the 
nineteenth century there were ‘migrant hostels’ for country folk who had moved to town (De 
Regt, 1984; De Swaan, 1988). And many Mediterranean guest workers, who came to the 
Netherlands in the twentieth century, initially lived in similar, simple guesthouses (Bovenkerk 
et al., 1985; Bolt and Van Kempen, 2002). The importance of  cheap rooming-houses and flop 
houses (‘flop’ was slang for bed in the 1920s) is also documented by scholars from the early 
Chicago School (see Anderson, 1923 and Zorbaugh, 1929).  
 
Economic activity  
 
Our database enables us to examine to what extent illegal residence correlates with the 
neighbourhood economy. We found indeed an elevated concentration of irregular immigrants 
as the neighbourhoods contain more businesses in the commercial service industry. Activity 
in semi-government institutions (ministries, schools, hospitals, etc.) does not influence the 
number of irregular immigrants. The latter observation is not so remarkable. After all, if semi-
government institutions do offer irregular immigrants chances of work, it will merely be 
indirectly (e.g., through cleaning agencies). 
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 These observations suggest that irregular immigrants   more often work in the service 
industry than in the manufacturing industry – at least in their immediate living environment. 
There are several explanations for this selective labour pattern. First of all it is common 
knowledge that irregular immigrants often perform jobs with a low social status, which do not 
appeal to the regular working population (Visser and Van Zevensbergen, 2001; Engbersen et 
al., 2002). Whereas low-skilled industrial labour has been largely automated and transferred 
to low-wage countries over the past decades, such cost savings were often impossible in the 
more labour-intensive service industry. Small and medium-sized enterprises, such as most 
ethnic shops, often depend on cheap and informal labour in order to make their business pay 
(Stepick, 1989).. Over the past decades, in the personal service industry in the Netherlands, 
many new migrant enterprises have emerged that often have access to irregular immigrants in 
their personal networks, at least more so than Dutch industrial entrepreneurs (Kloosterman, 
Van der Leun and Rath 1998; Van Tillaart 2001). According to some professionals some 
irregular immigrants travel on a tourist visa as labour migrants to the Netherlands to find a job 
in an ethnic shop or small (family) business with the help of family and friends. Finally, the 
risk of getting caught may differ per sector. Industrial enterprises are generally larger than 
service companies. Checking small firms for illegal workers may be inefficient. 
 The place of residence and place of work of irregular immigrants are linked in several 
ways. Several respondents told us they took up residence in the neighbourhood after they had 
found work there by asking around (Engbersen et al, 2006). Others were unemployed for a 
while and stayed in the neighbourhood after they had ultimately found work there. For 
specific groups of irregular immigrants, the place of residence and place of work are actually 
one and the same: they sleep at  their workplace.  Police data suggest this occurs primarily in 
businesses that cannot provide illegal workers with suitable accommodation in the immediate 
vicinity, such as Chinese restaurants, which are often located outside the migrant districts in 
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the Netherlands, and brothels in the inner cities or rural areas. However, some professionals 
told us that these practices sometimes take place in   migrant neighbourhoods as well. 
According to these informants such housing practices may indicate human trafficking and 
exploitation (see also Van der Leun and Vervoorn, 2004).  
 Economic activity may promote illegal residence, but the opposite may also be the 
case: the presence of irregular immigrants sometimes promotes specific types of economic 
activity.   In particular in de Schilderswijk,  many small semi-legal and shady employment 
agencies have been recently started that recruit irregular immigrants (Zuidam and Grijpstra 
2004). The companies that make use of their services (such as the Dutch horticulture green 
houses in the nearby Westland) are often located elsewhere. In this way the clients can profit 
from irregular immigrant labour, in spite of the governmental regulations and the increased 
checks on illegal labour. These companies do not risk the increased fines, as the employees 
are formally employed by the employment agencies.       
The effects of the neighbourhood economy on the concentration of irregular 
immigrants demonstrate the surplus value of multiple regression analyses. The twenty 
districts with the most irregular immigrants are characterized by a low number of businesses 
in the commercial service industry (see Table 1). Apparently, the elevated rate of illegal 
residence in these concentration areas is brought about mostly by the remaining dimensions of 
the opportunity structure of illegal residence, such as the presence of ethnic minorities. Hence  
it is likely  that the percentage of irregular immigrants there would increase further if more 
small businesses were set up. (After all, it would then become more attractive to have a family 
member come over illegally as it is more certain that the ‘follow-up migrant’ will be able to 
earn his or her own living and  will thus not constitute a financial burden.) 
 
Private homeownership 
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The presence of  private renting  – in table 2 indicated by the percentage of private home 
ownership, geographic data on private renting as such were not available – exerts an 
independent effect on the degree of illegal residence as well. On average, we find more 
irregular immigrants in deprived neighbourhoods with many immigrants and private 
homeownernership than in comparable neighbourhoods where the larger part of the housing 
stock is in the hands of housing associations (as is the case in most concentration areas) 
 It can be assumed that it is easier to house irregular immigrants in privately owned 
houses than in houses from housing associations (Burgers, 1998). There are two reasons for 
this. Firstly, irregular immigrants can no longer be the main tenant of houses of associations 
since the implementation of the so-called Koppelingswet (a law that made it possible to limit 
the access of  irregular immigrants to public services in 1998). Housing associations are now 
obliged to check the residence status of potential tenants in the population register (cf. Van 
der Leun, 2003). Private landlords do not have this obligation. So irregular immigrants can 
rent in the private sector, whereas they have only indirect access to housing association 
houses as (informal) subtenants or housemates. Secondly private premises can more easily be 
made suitable for occupation by a larger number of people than  intended (nowadays) (cf. 
Botman and van Kempen, 2001). It turns out that some landlords set up partition walls in their 
houses in order to rent out as many small rooms or beds as possible. A few landlords in 
districts such as Bospolder-Tussendijken and the Schilderwijk own hundreds of houses. In 
addition, there are many small private landlords who rent out one or two houses to irregular 
immigrants.  
 The positive effect of private homeownership  is revealed using multiple regression 
analyses. In the twenty concentration neighbourhoods (see table 1) most houses are owned by 
housing associations. Apparently, most irregular immigrants follow the residential pattern of 
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legal, non-western immigrants, with whom they live together as housemates or subtenants. At 
present, most non-western immigrants live in a housing association house (Van der Wouden 
en Bruine, 2001). Hence the rate of illegal residence would probably rise somewhat in these 
concentration areas (and in the Netherlands in general), if established non-western immigrants 
would live in (the vicinity) of private homes to a greater extent.     
  
Singles 
 
So far, the relations between single people and irregular immigrants have not been given 
much attention in the literature. However, previous research has documented that irregular 
immigrants sometimes entered into relationships with legal residents in order to obtain a 
residence permit (Staring, 1998; Engbersen, 2001). Furthermore, Burgers (1998) pointed to 
the reciprocal character of some relationships, which he often encountered among illegal 
prostitutes or ex-prostitutes. The presence of single people indeed appears to increase the rate 
of illegal residence even though we thought initially that the correlation was spurious. 
Irregular immigrants as well as singles are overrepresented in the poorer urban environments; 
just like irregular immigrants, many singles have lower incomes than people with families or 
people who cohabitate. And indeed: the effect of the percentage of singles on the 
concentration of irregular immigrants decreases when the percentage of non-western 
immigrants and the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood are controlled for. Still, the 
effect of the percentage of singles does not disappear.
6
 The positive correlation between the 
percentage of irregular immigrants and the percentage of singles can therefore not be 
attributed entirely to the fact that as a rule irregular immigrants live in neighbourhoods with 
many singles, and that the districts involved usually have a lower socioeconomic status. 
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The neighborhood studies confirm that there are  differing connections between singles and 
irregular immigrants. First of all, with singles, there appears to be an increased probability of 
subletting or partial subletting. The Dutch rent rebate system enables people with 
comparatively low incomes to rent relatively large houses, of which parts can be sublet to 
third parties. Furthermore, there is also the possibility that someone who initially lived 
together with a partner continues to rent the house after separation, and sublets parts thereof. 
According to some professionals, local residents somtimes rent a self-contained dwelling in 
order to become eligible for a (higher) unemployment benefit, whereas they actually do not 
live there, but re-let the dwelling to third parties. Supposedly, some local residents see renting 
a housing association house as a welcome opportunity to increase the family income. The 
formal  tenant moves in with his or her partner or relatives and sublets the housing association 
flat to a third party at a higher price. Informal subletting of social housing houses can be 
rather profitable as the official rent of these subsidized houses is lower than the market value 
(after deduction of the rent rebate).  
 Besides sublet practices, there is also the aspect of relationships between singles and 
irregular immigrants. Several professionals mentioned that some  legal residents have illegal 
partners. In their view, (heterosexual) singles are at least  providing accommodation to 
irregular immigrants of the opposite sex. These residents are in part older men who offer 
illegal young women a roof over their head. These are often indigent single men with 
relatively little chances on the ‘primary’ dating market. An employee of a The Hague housing 
association told us he encountered several cases each month involving singles – regular 
immigrants as well as Dutch natives - who had their partners come over illegally or who felt 
obliged to let their partners reside illegally in the Netherlands after their residence permit had 
expired (for instance because they could not sufficiently prove that they would be able to 
support that partner). In the Netherlands, the criteria for having a partner come over from 
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outside the EU have recently become increasingly restrictive (et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
local alien police regularly receive calls from people who claim to have ended their 
relationships and indicate that their partners are now probably residing illegally somewhere in 
the Netherlands. 
  
 
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants in combination and interaction 
 
So far we have demonstrated that the spreading  of the illegal population is related to  the 
distribution of the non-western ethnic minorities, the distribution of low-income and high-
income-income households, the distribution of certain types of economic activity, the 
distribution of privately owned (cheap) houses, and the distribution of (poor) single people. In 
other words: the patterns of spatial incorporation of irregular immigrants follow the more 
comprehensive allocation patterns among regular migrants, economic activity and single 
households, and elaborate on them. And yet the socioeconomic nature of the forces that 
determine the spatial incorporation of irregular immigrants does not, as such, provide 
sufficient explanation for the high degree of spatial concentration of the illegal population. 
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Illegal residence is primarily concentrated in a limited number of environments because the 
opportunity structure of illegal residence is itself spatially concentrated. The dimensions of 
this structure exhibit the strongest development in the cities (with the exception of private 
homeownership, which occurs relatively often outside the cities). In the cities, the separate 
dimensions are spatially concentrated in specific (residential) areas. After all, legal ethnic 
groups are not evenly spread over all  city districts. And houses for indigent households, 
relevant types of economic activity, and (indigent) singles  are also spatially concentrated. 
 Secondly, the determinants of illegal residence are often concentrated in the same 
neighbourhoods. High concentrations of non-western immigrants and single people are after 
all characteristic of city districts with a low socioeconomic status. Furthermore, economic 
activity in the personal service industry is clustered in urban areas (inside these areas it is 
quite evenly distributed, though). Private homeownership is, at least in the Netherlands, 
concentrated in districts where the other dimensions of the opportunity structure of illegal 
residence are relatively weakly developed.  Private homeownership is more often found 
outside the cities and within the city it is more scarce in poor districts than in affluent districts. 
This condition is in principle favourable for deconcentration of illegal residence. It might be 
the case that illegal residence in privately owned houses also occurs in the more well-to-do 
districts (cf. Mahler 1995). However, it is unlikely that this variant, in which the high rent is 
paid by a large number of irregular immigrants, occurs very often in the Netherlands(see note 
5).
 
 
 Thirdly, there are interactions between the determinants. In the statistical analyses we 
assumed that each neighbourhood characteristic had a separate effect and was independent of 
the other neighbourhood characteristics. This division into independent factors does not do 
full justice to the complex mutual dependencies in  social reality (cf. Elias 1978). For 
example, cohabitation of a single person and an irregular immigrant presupposes mutual 
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contact. The opportunities for that depend, among other things, on the extent to which single 
people and irregular immigrants fall back on the same neighbourhoods. Some respondents 
have met their partner in the neighborhood: 
 
Said is a 29 years old Moroccon man from Rabat who come to the Netherlands with a student 
visa in 1998. Family members who already lived in the Netherlands were willing to receive 
him. At first he lived with his uncle. Since 2000 Said resides in the Netherlands without a 
residence permit. He had discontinued his education and therefore his temporary residence 
permit was withdrawn. Shorthly thereafer Said met Marieke in a café in the neighborhood 
where they both lived. Marieke is a Dutch woman aged 28, who works as a receptionist for a 
small company. They fell in love and a after a year Said moved in with Marieke. As  Said is 
unemployed Marieke pays for their costs of living. They intend to get married before long. 
According to them, it is a marriage out of love, but they also marry because they believe that 
Said will not have to worry about his residence permit any longer. 
   
 
Furthermore, opportunities for illegal residence sometimes only occur when (potential) illegal 
migrants have family in the neighbourhood, more particularly, family who have connections 
with employers. An example of such a complex interaction effect is the establishment of 
illegal Bulgarians in the Randstad (urban agglomeration of Western Holland). They belong to 
a Turkish speaking minority in the east of Bulgaria. Particularly in the recent past, many 
Turkish agricultural labourers worked in the greenhouses of the horticultural area called 
Westland (Braam, 1994). Currently, an informal process of ‘ethnic succession’ can be 
observed, in which some upwardly mobile  Turks serve as a ‘middleman minority’ (cf. 
Bonacich, 1973) between the Dutch employers in the horticultural sector and the Bulgarian 
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newcomers. The settlement pattern of these labour migrants presupposes the combined spatial 
proximity of established Turkish immigrants, Dutch horticulturists, and cheap private houses 
in districts where such newcomers are inconspicuous. 
 There is a fourth reason for the spatial concentration of illegal residence. After some 
time, ‘shadow institutions’ (Scott, 1985) or ‘bastard institutions’ (Hughes, 1994) begin to 
develop in the concentration districts, catering specifically to illegal residents in the 
neighbourhood. These institutions are sometimes legal, but more often illegal. They involve 
Dutch volunteers who teach languages in the community centres, unqualified ‘doctors’ who 
provide medical advice and medical drugs in coffee houses, quasi-legal agencies that provide 
advice on how to obtain a residential permit, temporary employment agencies that take care of 
the required documents and work, and so on. These informal institutions have developed as a 
result of the ‘favourable’ climate for irregular immigrants to establish themselves, but are now 
an additional element of it. Although it is difficult to perceive such complex effects with 
regression analyses, our statistical findings also suggest that the concentration of irregular 
immigrants is in part the result of the extent to which the independent variables reinforce each 
other.
 
Note that the trend line in Figure 6 – in it the number of registered home addresses of 
illegal aliens per thousand legal residents (the indicator for the relative concentration of illegal 
aliens) is compared with the predicted relative concentration of illegal aliens on the basis of 
the neighbourhood characteristics (fifth regression model; each circle in the figure represents 
an urban neighbourhood) - is not linear, but exponential. This suggests that in concentration 
areas the actual degree of illegal residence is somewhat greater than predicted on the basis of 
the sum of the effects of the separate independent variables. (Note also that Figure 6 shows 
quite some unexplained variance; it turns out, however, that the empirical ‘anomalies’ can be 
accounted for, they do not contradict our theoretical approach).
7
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Discussion 
 
On a theoretical and empirical basis, we have made plausible  that the number of illegal 
residents in neighbourhoods is determined by the scale at which legal non-western 
immigrants, specific economic activities, cheap housing opportunities and single people are 
present in neighbourhoods – as well as by the extent to which these dimensions of the spatial 
opportunity structure for illegal residence  are coupled there with one another. Not only do the 
above-mentioned neighbourhood characteristics facilitate  illegal residence, they also generate 
a demand for it. Many irregular immigrants satisfy economic and affective needs of family 
members, friends, partners and employers. Seen from this perspective, irregular immigration 
can not be qualified as undesirable. It encompasses all types of migration that also have legal 
counterparts, such as chain migration, labour migration, family-forming migration and asylum 
migration.The foregoing warrants five hypotheses on the spatial distribution and 
concentration of irregular immigrants in other western immigration countries (cf. Cornelius et 
al. 2004).  
 Firstly, there must be sizable groups of irregular immigrants   in other immigration 
countries as well. After all, most western countries have had a migration surplus for several 
decades, which led to the settlements of a large number of ethnic minority groups. We have 
shown that there are direct and indirect causal relations between legal and irregular 
immigration. The other dimensions of the opportunity structure of illegal residence are also 
largely present in other immigration countries. 
 Secondly, it is likely that irregular immigrants are also spatially concentrated in other 
immigration countries. In western societies - since the industrialization in particular - the 
social classes exist in relative isolation, and the spheres of living, labour and consumption 
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have become more segregated (Lofland, 1998; De Swaan, 1988; Jargowsky, 1997).  Western 
countries have also always known ethnic segregation (Lofland, 1998). The spatial 
incorporation of irregular immigrants follows such class and ethnicity related separations 
among the regular population, and builds on them. 
 Thirdly, the percentage of irregular immigrants will differ per country. Although it is 
hard to say what the combination of factors will be like exactly in other countries, one can 
observe that the dimensions of the spatial opportunity structure are not equally well developed 
everywhere. For example, there are national differences in the size of the post-industrial 
service sectors (Musterd and van Kempen, 2000). And, whereas almost 50% of the 
households in some Northern European cities consist of singles – although an increasing 
proportion of these singles are in the final phase of life –, married couples with children are 
still dominant in southern Europe (Musterd and van Kempen, 2000). Countries such as Japan 
and Greece have only recently become immigration countries. 
 Fourthly, we expect country-specific variation in the composition of the illegal 
population. The ethnic background of minority groups is closely related to  the European 
colonial past (Sassen, 1999). This explains, for example, why  quite a few  illegal Latin 
Americans live in Spain and Portugal, while the irregular immigrants in France and England 
are predominantly from African and Asian origin. The extent to which the bottom of the 
housing market is subsidized also differs, as does the degree of private homeownership. For 
example, in Belgium and France, a large part of the housing stock is in the hands of private 
owners (Musterd and van Kempen, 2000). The presence of private homeownership is 
particularly favourable for the illegal ‘forerunners’ without supportive social networks. They 
can rent directly from the landlords, some of whom have adjusted their houses  specially for 
the purpose of leasing to irregular immigrants. Illegal newcomers are then less dependent on 
the goodwill of their extended families, friends or acquaintances for accommodation. Social 
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democratic and corporatist welfare states such as the Netherlands, Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries actually offer rather favourable housing conditions for illegal follow-
up migration. Newcomers with established family or friends also benefit from this 
‘decommodification’ of the housing market, as subtenants paying a ‘friendly price’ or as 
housemates (cf. Burgers, 1998). The official main tenants, who pay rather low housing costs, 
will of course be more readily inclined to re-let their houses or parts thereof to an illegal 
acquaintance or family member at a low price. They can also afford to have an illegal 
newcomer stay for free more easily. 
 Fifthly, national differences in the extent of the spatial concentration of the illegal 
population may also be expected (although it probably is a spatially concentrated 
phenomenon everywhere). The extent of spatial concentration depends on the degree of 
socioeconomic and ethnic segregation among the regular population. The Netherlands has a 
progressive tax system and pursues an egalitarian income policy on the housing market as 
well, with all kinds of rent rebates and building subsidies. These policies  temper residential 
segregation according to income and also promote, albeit indirectly and unforeseen, a certain 
dispersion of the illegal population across a somewhat larger number of neighbourhoods. In 
countries such as the USA and Belgium, where the state pursues a less progressive income 
policy (through the housing market), irregular immigrants will be less evenly distributed 
across the urban landscape than in the Netherlands. 
 
In conclusion 
 
The social and economic opportunities for illegal residence and the willingness and necessity 
to make use of it will not disappear in the foreseeable future., Many developing countries will 
be facing an increase in the number of potential emigrants as a result of the continuous 
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population growth and limited economic prospects (Bauman 2004; OECD 2005). On the 
‘demand side’, there are also developments that promote immigration (legal and illegal). For 
example, as a result of the globalization of social and economic life in an increasing number 
of western countries, more ethnic groups will maintain transnational relations (Portes, 1999; 
Snel et al., 2005). But this is certainly not the only determinant of illegal residence that has 
found a strong foothold in society. Paid personal services currently constitute one of the 
largest growth sectors in the western countries. Furthermore, due to the implementation of 
neo-liberal policies of privatization, an increasing part of the housing stock go into private 
hands (cf. O’Loughin and Friedrichs, 1996, Thoms, 2002). Finally, in western city districts, 
more and more singles  yearn (again) for a partner in life (Blok et al., 2000; Bauman, 2003).
 It goes without saying that the uneven global distribution of life opportunities in a time 
of intensified globalization is the  root cause of  migration from poor countries to the western 
world. Although emigration to a rich western country remains a pipe dream for most of the 
people in  poor countries, many will continue to try their luck in countries such as the 
Netherlands. Our study shows that, although irregular immigrants are by law excluded from 
national territories and formal institutions ( official labour markets and public provisions) 
irregular immigration has become firmly embedded in the social and economic structures of 
advanced societies.  
The structural determinants of irregular immigration are often ignored in the current  
‘fight against illegal immigration’. However, it would be wise to take these structural 
determinants of irregular immigration into consideration and to redress current restrictive 
migration policies that contribute to the growth of ‘shadow places’. For example, an 
expansion of temporary labour migration programmes will enable groups of irregular 
labourers to work legally, and will counteract the development of informal labour markets 
(and the activities of the illegal subcontractors involved).  Similarly, the legalisation of 
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specific groups of irregular migrants could be a relevant option . Significant regularisation 
programmes have been carried out over the past few years in countries such as Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, but they remain unthinkable options for advanced European welfare states 
(Germany, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, United Kingdom). Other policy options 
include realistic return programmes that stimulate people to go back voluntarily, in a 
sustainable manner. Such measures would contribute to the reduction of shadow places in the 
big cities of immigration societies. Furthermore, it would be advisable to create legal 
temporary housing for temporary workers. Temporary labour migration is increasing (OECD 
2006), especially from Eastern Europe, but in many immigration countries there is no legal 
housing infrastructure that effectively deals with these labour migrants.  
   
 34 
Notes: 
 
 
1. Of all apprehensions 52% lack a registered residential address. In approximately 
20,000 of these cases it is likely that the apprehended immigrants concerned did not 
yet have residential addresses in the Netherlands. For these apprehensions have taken 
place at (air)ports, state highways and train stations, have been carried out by the 
military police, or happened at the (registered) day of arrival in the Netherlands. If 
these apprehensions are left out of consideration, the percentage of missing values 
decreased from 53 to 42. Police stations have been identified with the help of the 
Internet. In order to check whether the registered home addresses described the place 
of apprehension rather than the place of residence, a sample was taken from the data 
(n=1500). In 381 cases the residential address was equal to the place of apprehension. 
However, these are not necessarily invalid registrations. For at least 74 of the 381 
cases pertain to centres for asylum seekers, brothels, companies and market-gardeners. 
It may well be that the arrested immigrants actually resided where they were 
apprehended . The analyses in the first part of the article (the level of municipalities) 
are based on 28,857 apprehensions. The analyses on the neighbourhood level are 
based on 23,775 apprehensions.  
2. Cruyff and Van der Heijden (2004) reported separate estimates for provinces and 
police districts of the four biggest cities. These estimates are based on the place of 
apprehension (and not, as is the case in this article, on the registered residential 
addresses). For the year 2002 we compared their estimates with the number of 
apprehensions in our database. For nearly all provinces the number of apprehensions 
equals between 9 and 11 percent of the estimated total number of irregular 
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immigrants. Only the province Utrecht deviates (5%). This suggests that there are no 
big geographical differences in risk of arrest between urban and rural areas. When we 
compare the police regions in the big cities we find that the risk of arrest appears to be 
elevated somewhat in Amsterdam (15%). 
. 
 
3. The measure for the relative concentration of illegal residence shows a rather skewed 
distribution; therefore ten ‘outliers’ –neighbourhoods where the relative concentration 
is more than three standard deviations higher than on an average – have been excluded 
from the analyses. This did not affect the statistical significance of the analyses, as the 
total number of urban neighbourhoods is more than 1200 (see table 2).    
4. Next to the share of single persons two additional neighbourhood characteristics had a 
significant effect on the concentration of irregular immigrants, i.e. the average size of 
families and the percentage of families with children. Both variables are, however, 
strongly correlated with the other independent variables (particularly with the 
percentage non-western immigrants). For statistical reasons (‘collinearity’) these 
variables could not be included in the model. The ‘effect’ of both variables is probably 
merely due to the effect of the percentage of non-western immigrants.        
5. It is difficult, however, to isolate the effects of the presence of legal, non-western 
immigrants from the effects of the socio-economic status of the neighbourhoods. For 
ethnic segregation is, in part, due to ethnic group differences in income (cf. Farley, 
1991, p. 288). The standardized effect of the socio-economic status of the 
neighbourhoods diminished from –.34 when the concentration of irregular immigrants 
is only predicted with the value of the housing stock and the average income of the 
residents (not shown in table 2), to –.07 when the share of non-western immigrants 
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was controlled for (see the second model). Still, it is possible that a small number of 
irregular immigrants live in upmarket areas - for instance irregular domestic workers 
(see Mahler 1995 on this topic for the United States). We did not, however, find 
indications for it in the Dutch police data. In the Netherlands, with its cultural taboos 
on sharp class divisions, domestic workers usually do not live with their employers. In 
the Netherlands it is also easier to find more suitable accommodation in cheaper areas 
at acceptable travel distance from the work place, for neighbourhoods are smaller than 
in the United States, and the rate of income segregation is substantially lower in the 
Netherlands than in the United States; in Dutch neighbourhoods cheap and expensive 
blocks are located much closer to each other than in the United States 
.  
6 The standardised effect drops from .29, when the concentration of irregular immigrants 
is only predicted on the basis of the percentage of single residents, to .24 when the 
percentage of legal, non-western immigrants is added to the model, to .20 in the fifth 
regression model. 
     
7. We obtained additional information on twelve neighbourhoods for which the model 
does not accurately predict the number of registered illegal aliens (these neighbourhoods 
are highlighted in the figure). It turns out that such anomalies can be quite well explained 
and do not contradict our theoretical approach. Neighbourhoods with more illegal aliens 
than predicted are namely either being used as prostitution areas, or house (or have in their 
vicinity) asylum seekers’ centres or market gardens.  No suitable statistical data could be 
found on these aspects of the first and third dimensions of the spatial opportunity structure 
for illegal aliens – i.e. the presence of compatriots in asylum seekers’ centres and the 
opportunities for illegal labour in prostitution areas. Neighbourhoods with fewer 
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registered illegal aliens than predicted were mainly found in Amsterdam and Rotterdam 
(where the home addresses of illegal aliens are not very accurately recorded), or were 
affluent districts with many single people and much private homeownership. If we had 
had data on the concentration of single people with low incomes and private ownership of 
inexpensive houses, we would probably have predicted the concentration of illegal aliens 
for these neighbourhoods more adequately. If the twelve highlighted neighbourhoods are 
left out of consideration, the model’s explanatory power increases from fifty to sixty 
percent. The remaining unexplained variance, which is never nihil in case of empirical 
research, probably points to similar measurement errors, or to unmeasured variables such 
as the presence of churches, psychiatric clinics and institutions for the homeless. These 
institutions sometimes house illegal aliens, particularly those who are unemployed and 
have no supportive network of family and friends (‘floating population’). 
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